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Joel Lexchin1,2,3Abstract
Some drugs eventually have to be removed from the market because of a negative benefit-to-harm ratio, including
an excess of mortality. Drug safety is the result of multiple factors, commencing with how clinical trials are designed,
the information generated by and/or hidden through these trials, trial analysis by drug regulatory authorities (DRAs)
and the amount of information that DRAs choose to release, the amount of published information regarding drug
safety, the effectiveness of postmarket surveillance systems in recognizing and reporting adverse drug reactions, and
the structure of DRAs such as the United States Food and Drug Administration and its equivalent in other countries.
This commentary will look at each of these issues in order to highlight the problems in the current approach to drug
safety and finally indicate how some of these deficiencies should be addressed.
Please see related article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-014-0262-7
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but only a very few drugs are removed from the market
for this reason. In a research article published in BMC
Medicine, Onakpoya and colleagues [1] provide the first
systematic examination of drugs withdrawn from the
market because of a link to mortality. Their study high-
lights a number of issues that bear further examination.
Why do so few withdrawals occur in African countries
as opposed to European ones and why are many drugs
not withdrawn worldwide? Second, they find that we are
getting better at recognizing drug-related mortality but
no better at dealing with the problem. While we wait to
take action on these drugs, millions of people are being
exposed to potentially deadly medications [2]. Although
the article deals with drugs that lead to death at both
therapeutic doses and overdoses, this commentary only
deals with the former group.Where do withdrawals occur?
The question of where withdrawals occur points to a
problem that has long been recognized; only a few devel-
oping countries have a well-functioning drug regulatoryCorrespondence: jlexchin@yorku.ca
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unless otherwise stated.authority (DRA) [3] and pharmacovigilance systems in
these countries are generally rudimentary [4]. Dealing
with these problems is something that the global com-
munity needs to tackle, but the lead agency in this re-
gard, the World Health Organization, is affected by a
lack of resources [5].Factors involved in recognizing and dealing with
potentially unsafe drugs
The finding that we are recognizing problems more
quickly but failing to deal with them any faster suggests
that some elements in the drug safety system are im-
proving whereas others are not seeing any progress.
Drug safety is the result of multiple factors starting with
how clinical trials are designed, what information these
trials generate and what may be hidden, how the trials
are analyzed by DRAs, what is published and what is
not, how well the postmarket surveillance system func-
tions, and the structure of DRAs such as the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its
equivalent in other countries.Recognizing dangerous drugs in clinical trials
It is well known that clinical trials are primarily designed
to show that a drug is efficacious and not to detect any-
thing other than relatively common safety problems.
Who is included and excluded from clinical trials isis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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then, when doctors prescribe for them, they have little
or no information about what kind of side effects may
occur. That typically means a lack of knowledge of how
the drug will behave in people who are taking other
medications, who have other chronic conditions, or
who may not metabolize the drug in a well understood
manner, i.e., children or the elderly. Clinical trials typic-
ally enroll, at most, about 5,000 patients and, therefore,
any side effect, serious or trivial, that occurs in fewer
than about 1 in 1,700 people will not necessarily be
observed.
There have been a number of documented instances
where pharmaceutical companies failed to provide mor-
tality data to the FDA in a timely manner minimizing
the appearance of a mortality risk and producing an
apparent decrease in the danger associated with the
drug [6,7].
Are reviewers within DRAs picking up on safety sig-
nals in clinical trials? In most of the world the answer is
that we do not know. Drug safety reports are publicly
available on the FDA website, but are redacted to re-
move confidential information. Woloshin and Schwartz
have called on the FDA to make information more ac-
cessible by creating “standardized executive summaries
of drug reviews that quantify the benefit and important
harms found in the phase III trials” and that highlight
remaining uncertainties [8]. Documents from some
regulatory agencies that are supposed to outline the
clinical basis behind the approval of new drugs do not
disclose all the relevant information necessary to ad-
equately assess the safety of the products [9,10]. Speed-
ing up reviews of new drug submissions may get new
drugs onto the market faster, but at the expense of
more safety problems once they are being used by
patients [11,12].
Under-reporting of drug safety information
Safety information is routinely under-reported in pub-
lished reports of randomized clinical trials. In one assess-
ment of publications in six high-impact general medical
journals, no information on severe adverse events and
withdrawal of patients owing to an adverse event was
given in 27.1% and 47.4% of articles, respectively. Restric-
tions in the reporting of harm-related data appeared in
under one-third of articles [13]. Similar findings have been
reported in other specialty journals [14].
There is significant under-reporting of adverse drug
reactions. A systematic review of 37 studies from 12
countries found that the median under-reporting rate
was 94% [15]. Even for extremely serious reactions, such
as toxic epidermal necrolysis, under-reporting may be as
high as 96% [16]. When reports contain insufficient de-
tail, then doctors (and patients) have a false sense ofsecurity about the safety of the products that they are
prescribing and using. The number of serious and fatal
adverse drug reactions reported to the FDA between
1998 and 2005 went up 2.6- and 2.7- fold, respectively;
reported serious events increased four times faster than
the total number of outpatient prescriptions [17].
Complicating under-reporting are documented inci-
dents where drug companies have disguised the nature
of the reactions that they have reported to DRAs. Pri-
mary pulmonary hypertension was a recognized prob-
lem with dexfenfluramine and therefore reports about
this condition were expected, whereas heart valve dam-
age was unknown and reports about this side effect
were unexpected [18]. An analysis of adverse drug event
reports from the pharmaceutical company involved
showed that many reports listed primary pulmonary
hypertension first and heart valve damage second possibly
in order to downplay the discovery of this new and
significant problem [18].
The role of regulatory agencies in handling
adverse drug reactions
Many DRAs prioritize the drug approval process over
drug safety. Within one agency, over three times the
money and three times the number of personnel are de-
voted to the former as opposed to the latter [19]. In an-
other agency, the hierarchical relationship between the
office that approves new drugs and the one that moni-
tors postmarket safety elevates the opinions of officials
in the former above those of the epidemiologists, drug
safety specialists, and risk communications officers who
evaluate safety [20].
Once adverse drug reactions are recognized, they may
still not be communicated appropriately and in a timely
manner. For example, the FDA wanted to add a warning
to the rofecoxib label about cardiovascular risks in light
of the findings from the VIGOR trial, but there were ob-
jections from the pharmaceutical industry. The resulting
negotiations took over a year to ultimately lead to a
change and rather than going into the “warning” section
of the label, it ended up in the less prominent “precau-
tions” section and was said to be of unknown clinical
significance [8].
Conclusions
What is improving and what is not in this complex
interplay of factors? The bottom line is that we have not
collected the data to assess this. The first step in de-
creasing the number of people who die from drugs is to
understand which issues to focus on. To that end, the
first steps involve better resourcing of the postmarket
surveillance system, placing drug safety on a par with
drug approvals, and increasing the transparency of infor-
mation from both pharmaceutical companies and DRAs.
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